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Do family firms learn more from other family firms than from non-family firms? 
Adoption of the board reform 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Family firms differ from non-family firms because their owners are often motivated not only 
by economic incentives but also by non-economic considerations. This study investigates the 
effects of such non-economic motivation, especially the extent of family involvement and 
family legacy, on the adoption of a new practice, i.e., board reform that was newly introduced 
in the Japanese context in the late 1990s. Our empirical results show that while family firms 
are less likely to implement the board reform than non-family firms, board interlocks with 
other family firms facilitate the adoption. We also found that such factors as large family 
ownership and family legacy influence the impact of such board interlocks on family firms’ 
decision to reform their boards.  
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing research interest in family business and family firms in the 
management field.  Indeed, the number of studies on family firms has been increasing. One of 
the key dimensions that differentiate family firms from non-family firms is that managerial 
decisions and choices in family firms are often influenced not only by financial incentives but 
also by non-economic goals of family owners (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & Castro, 2011). 
In prior corporate governance research based on agency theory, managers are assumed to 
pursue their self-interests that often diverge from the interests of shareholders (Fama, 1980; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Key assumptions in this theory are that there is a conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders, and that the latter are mainly interested in 
financial gain. In family firms, however, these assumptions do not always hold as family 
owners often occupy managerial positions or have significant influence over non-family 
managers while their interests tend to be more than just financial (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; 
Le Breton Miller & Miller, 2006).  
Extant research indeed indicates that family owners are driven by incentives to 
preserve and enhance not only their financial gain but also their non-financial goals. For 
instance, large family owners have been shown to use the board to strengthen their control 
over top managers to protect and enhance the family’s interests and to legitimize the 
appointment of directors and executives whose strategic choices foster the family’s non-
economic goals or socioemotional wealth (Jones, Makri, & Gomez-Mejia, 2008). Prior 
studies on managerial incentives show that family executives tend to receive lower 
compensation because they are willing to sacrifice higher pay for greater job security and for 
emotional rewards from their position (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003). This 
suggests that financial incentives are likely less important than other rewards related to non-
financial goals to family executives. Other studies reveal that family firms tend to value 
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employees’ loyalty and long-term focus, which enhance those employees’ identification with 
the firm and promote shared values with family owners (Davis & Harveston, 2001; Harris & 
Reid, 2008). Family firms’ governance practices, hence, reflect the objective of enhancing 
non-economic goals of family owners through loyal employees who share family values and 
visions.  
While those studies inform us that attainment of non-economic goals often drives 
family firms’ governance choices, some practices have mixed implications for such goals. 
Specifically, this study analyzes the adoption of board reform – i.e., a clearer separation of 
decision-making rights from monitoring – right after its introduction in Japan in 1996. By 
trying to maintain strong family control over the board, a firm may risk losing legitimacy in 
the eyes of external stakeholders if the board is dominated by family members or other non-
family directors under strong family influence.  In contrast, the board reform which aims to 
enhance the board’s monitoring function may not be favorably perceived by family owners, 
but it might enhance the firm’s external legitimacy especially in the eyes of investors, leading 
to potential conflict between different dimensions of non-economic objectives (Vardaman & 
Gondo, 2014; Wright, Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2014). We aim to examine the effects of 
family control on the adoption of this newly introduced practice which has conflicting 
implications on family owners’ non-economic goals.   
Our main objective is to examine the impact of board interlocks that are theorized to 
facilitate the transfer of information in prior research (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Davis, 
1991; Palmer, Zhou, Barber, & Soysal, 1995). In a firm’s decision to adopt a new practice, 
access to relevant information is likely to be critical. In this study, we specifically investigate 
the effects of board interlocks formed by executives and outside directors of the focal firm on 
the adoption decision of board reform (Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993). We specifically 
examine the effects of board interlocks with other family firms on the adoption of board 
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reform.  It is theorized that family firms not only seek to establish board interlocks with other 
family firms (Cannella, Jones, & Withers,2015), but also learn from other family firms that 
tend to share common values, interests and relevant experiences (Kraatz, 1998). We also 
investigate the effects of such factors as family ownership and the strength of family legacy 
on the impact of board interlocks on the decision to reform the board.  We expect that these 
factors reflect the degree of the family’s control and unique identity, which influence the 
extent of family firms’ reliance on other family firms for information about new practices.  
Our empirical analyses largely support our argument that these factors affect the impact of 
board interlocks with other family firms on the adoption decision.  
This study makes several theoretical contributions. First, it contributes to the family 
business literature by showing how family firms assess a new managerial practice and 
examine how such practice fosters or hinders the family owners’ non-economic goals, which 
in turn influences their adoption decision. Second, by incorporating the board interlock 
research into the family business research, this study illustrates that while information 
transferred through board interlocks is important for family firms when they make an 
adoption decision, the sources of the information are also important. We show that, in general, 
board interlocks with other family firms significantly influence the adoption decision.  Third, 
we also contribute to research on organizational learning by showing board interlocks with 
other family firms have varying effects among family firms depending upon such factors as 
family ownership and family legacy.  In other words, family firms are heterogeneous and 
hence, how they learn from other seemingly similar firms also varies.  
THEORY     
Family Firms and Their Non-Economic Goals 
The presence of family owners is a widespread phenomenon in many contexts (La 
Porta, et al., 1999), including Japan.  Among publicly-listed Japanese firms, 58 percent have 
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family owners (Okamuro, Shim &  Wiwattanakantang,  2008). Since these owners often have 
the power to influence or, if they also hold managerial positions, to make key managerial 
decisions, it is important to understand their interest and incentives to implement new 
practices. Prior research suggests that family owners are different from other types of owners 
such as institutional investors because they have economic as well as non-economic interests 
such as maintaining the family control and passing their firm to the next generation, or 
preserving socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nurez-Nickel & Monyano-
Fuentes, 2007;  Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Indeed, prior studies argue that as family owners 
often aim to pass on the firm to the next generation, they are more interested in retaining 
control and ensuring a firm’s long-term survival rather than short-term profitability (James, 
1999; Le Breton Miller & Miller, 2006). Those owners also care about their firm’s legitimacy 
and reputation as their family name is closely linked to them (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, 
& Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013; Dyer & Whetten, 2006). Such 
emphasis on non-financial goals will likely influence governance choices in family firms.  
While prior research treats family owners’ interest in pursuing non-economic goals as 
rather distinct from their financial interest, such non-economic goals also have multiple 
aspects (Vardaman & Gondo, 2014).  For example, earlier studies point out that family 
owners tend to emphasize their control over the management and board, long-term survival of 
their firm, preservation of family values and family environment, employee loyalty, and 
legitimacy (Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; James, 1999).  Although these 
goals are directly or indirectly related, they may not always be compatible under some 
circumstances. For example, family owners’ desire to retain control over the management or 
board may negatively impact employees’ loyalty or their firm’s external legitimacy. This 
suggests that family owners may sometimes make decisions that prioritize some non-
economic goals over others.  In this study, we examine how family firms make decisions 
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regarding the adoption of a new practice, board reform, that serves different aspects of their 
non-economic goals, and how information on those practices transferred by board ties 
moderates their decisions in the Japanese context.  
While new practices can spread among firms through various channels, prior research 
treats board interlocks with prior adopters as one important mechanism that facilitates the 
transfer of relevant information (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 
1993). But it is likely that not all interlock ties have the same or similar effects on inter-
organizational learning. Cannella and colleagues (2015) suggest that common or similar 
interests and identity often lead family firms to establish interlock ties to other family firms.  
If similarity among family firms makes board interlocks more likely to happen, then it is also 
possible that those firms also learn from other similar firms through such ties, because similar 
firms tend to share or face similar issues and problems and also seek similar objectives. We 
examine this issue with the adoption of the board reform.        
Board Reform – Executive Officer System (EOS) 
 Although Japanese boards are legally responsible for monitoring management similar 
to boards in other countries, they have been dominated by insiders or executives of the firm.1 
This is largely due to the fact that a board position is usually regarded as the highest rank that 
employees can reach through their long tenure at the same firm after they graduated from 
school (Abegglen & Stalk, 1985; Charkham, 1994). This means that there was no clear 
separation of monitoring and execution functions within the board (Ahmadjian & Okumura, 
2005). Many boards had a small number of outside directors, but they were usually affiliated 
with banks and other non-financial firms with which the focal firm had business relationships 
                                                          
1 Recently implemented corporate goverance code in Japan in 2015 requires Japanese firms to appoint at least 
two independent directors or they need to explain if they do not make such appointment. Many Japanese firms 
have complied with this requimenet by appointing multiple independent drectors.  Thus, the board composition 
of Japanese firms has started to change.  
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and hence they lack independence (Gerlach, 1992; Miwa & Ramseyer, 2005). Since those 
outside directors sat on the board for business relationship purposes or to monitor 
management on behalf of those affiliated firms, they did not represent the interests of other 
investors that seek more financial returns (David, O’Brien, Yoshikawa, & Delios, 2010). 
               This insider-dominated board of Japanese firms started to change gradually after 
Sony initiated a board reform by introducing the so-called “Executive Office System (EOS)” 
in 1997.  Under this system, the board size was substantially reduced and the former board 
members were separated into “genuine” board members and “executive officers.”  The 
objectives of this board reform measure were to improve managerial decision-making speed 
with smaller board size and to establish clear accountability for execution and for monitoring 
through separation of these functions (Ahmadjian & Okumura, 2005). The EOS was designed 
to follow the agency theoretic logic of governance typical in U.S. firms (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976); a board consisted mostly of non-executive directors who monitor the executive 
officers who execute strategy. Although the EOS entails a politically difficult aspect as 
switching a position from a board director to an executive office may be perceived as 
“demotion” as executive officers are not legally board members (Ahmadjian & Yoshikawa, 
2013), the practice still diffused widely and quickly among Japanese firms after Sony adopted 
it. However, most Japanese boards remained insider-dominated even after the diffusion of 
this practice until quite recently as there was no legal requirement for Japanese firms to have 
independent directors on the board. Yet, this system was still perceived as a step toward the 
U.S. style board which separates execution and managerial monitoring (Yoshikawa, Tsui-
Auch, & McGuire, 2007).   
HYPOTHESES 
Adoption of Board Reform (Executive Officer System) in Family Firms 
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 When family owners have a controlling or large equity stake in the firm, it is expected 
that those owners attempt to use the board to advance their interests including the 
preservation of their socioemotional wealth (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011). For example, family owners can use the board to justify the executive and board 
appointments of individuals who share the family values and thereby attempt to look after the 
family owners’ desire to leave the family legacy. Family owners can also use the board to 
pursue strategic directions and investments that enhance their non-economic goals (Jones et 
al., 2008).  Indeed, prior research shows that family owners exert strong influence on boards 
often through board representation (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 
2005; Mustakallio, Autio, & Zahra, 2002). This suggests that family owners are likely to 
attempt to preserve their control on boards and thus oppose any board reform measures that 
may jeopardize their control.  
 The EOS, which usually includes the reduction of board size and the separation of 
execution and monitoring functions, may seem not too attractive to family owners for the 
non-economic or socioemotional reasons. Smaller board size means that there are fewer 
director positions, which will likely make it more difficult to maintain extant family 
representation on the board. If family owners attempt to maintain their board representation, 
they may have to allocate fewer board positions to non-family managers. This can, however, 
negatively impact the morale of those managers due to the limited promotion opportunities. 
Especially, as family firms tend to value employee loyalty with long tenure (Davis & 
Harveston, 2001), family owners may want to avoid being perceived as providing less 
opportunities to non-family employees and managers for promotion to the board position 
which was traditionally regarded as the highest rank that employees can aspire to reach in 
Japanese firms (Abegglen & Stalk, 1985).  
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In addition, as family owners and managers will likely prefer less control and 
monitoring by non-family executives on the board due to their desire to retain greater 
discretion, the separation of execution and monitoring functions would not be attractive.  If 
family owners separate these two functions by appointing family members as board members 
and non-family members as executive officers, they can avoid the structure where non-family 
board members monitor family executives. However, such an arrangement can negatively 
influence non-family managers’ morale and ultimately damage their company loyalty, 
especially as the switch from a director position to an executive officer position was 
perceived as demotion when the EOS started to spread (Ahmadjian & Yoshikawa, 2013). 
Hence, any board reform that enhances the board’s monitoring function will likely not be 
welcomed by family owners.  
The adoption of the new board reform such as the EOS may, however, send a 
legitimacy signal to external stakeholders, especially to those that the firm is paying closer 
attention.  Family firms have a tendency to seek legitimacy from external stakeholders 
because social sanctions may damage not only the firm’s reputation but also the family name 
(Berrone et al., 2010; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Miller, Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013), and 
they have a desire to preserve and accumulate social capital with those stakeholders such as 
suppliers, customers, creditors, and investors, for their long-term viability (Carney, 2005).  
However, family owners could not precisely predict the implications of the EOS in the initial 
stage of its diffusion. This poses a great risk to those family owners especially as the practice 
may entail changes in the firm’s decision-making structure at the highest level. Therefore, 
other things being equal, the negative factors likely outweigh the benefits of the adoption. We 
thus predict that family firms tend not to adopt the EOS.               
Hypothesis 1: Family firms are not likely to adopt the board reform (EOS). 
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Effects of Board Interlocks on the Adoption of Board Reform 
 Family owners are unlikely to be interested in adopting the EOS, because it 
potentially limits the number of board positions for both family and non-family managers. It 
also entails the separation of execution and monitoring functions, which can potentially 
constrain managerial discretion for family managers and owners. Therefore, we have 
predicted that family owners will likely not choose to adopt the EOS.  
 However, because of the lack of a clear monitoring function of Japanese boards which 
were dominated by insiders and also because of poor financial performance of many Japanese 
firms in the 1990s, board reforms were attracting great attention, especially among 
institutional investors such as CalPERS (Ahmadjian & Okumura, 2005; Yoshikawa et al., 
2007).  For example, Sony’s move to initiate the EOS in 1996 was widely reported in the 
media as the initial step toward the “Anglo-American” model that was then perceived as the 
global standard of corporate governance (Ahmadjian & Okumura, 2005). Therefore, there 
was rising pressure on Japanese firms to address their corporate governance problems in the 
late 1990s.  
 While it is expected that family owners were reluctant to implement board reform that 
may negatively impact their control on the board, the information about the EOS transferred 
through board ties could somewhat mitigate their anxiety. Managers who sit on the board of 
prior adopters or directors who are transferred from such firms can provide first-hand 
information about the practice from prior adopter firms.  In the case of board reform, those 
who have board ties to prior adopters can directly observe how the board functions after the 
board reform in the tied-to firm. For example, the information shared by those directors about 
how the adopting firms implemented the practice and how their management handled the 
sensitive issue of appointing (or demoting) some former board members as executive officers 
could be insightful to family owners. Hence, rich information provided by outside directors 
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may be effective in reducing anxiety of a focal firm’s management.  Especially in the early 
stage of the diffusion of this reform, it is expected that any first-hand information provided by 
directors who are connected with prior adopters likely has an important impact. Therefore, 
board interlocks with prior adopters likely facilitate the adoption of the EOS.    
Further, although family owners  have weak incentives to adopt the EOS as it may 
negatively affect their board control which is an important aspect of their non-economic goals, 
an adoption of the EOS will likely positively contribute to enhancing external legitimacy of 
the adopting firms. This is especially so in the institutional environment where normative 
pressure to address the corporate governance problem is rising (Yoshikawa et al., 2007).  
Thus, those owners may not be always against the adoption of the board reform measure 
under some conditions because greater external legitimacy is one important aspect of family 
owners’ socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2010; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Miller et al., 
2013).  
Family owners’ concerns such as the retention of managerial control in the board and 
removal of some board members would likely be sensitive in non-family firms as well.  The 
EOS may pose a challenge to extant management of non-family firms as in family firms 
because it entails the top management structure and the board composition.  Also, non-family 
firms may also have incentives to gain external legitimacy by adopting the board reform that 
institutional investors appreciate.  However, as most of the top executives in non-family firms 
are usually professional managers with no or only small equity stakes in firms they manage, 
especially in the Japanese context (Kubo, 2010), structural change of the board poses less 
threat to their control unlike family managers who may be concerned about having more non-
family directors.  Further, compared to family firms where family owners exert strong control, 
it is likely that non-family firms may not face the same level of pressure to show legitimacy 
through board reform.  Hence, managers of non-family firms would likely be less concerned 
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about the adoption of the EOS compared o family managers and owners. We therefore argue 
that non-family firms tend to place less importance to first-hand information transferred 
through board ties to prior adopters.    
Hypothesis 2: Board ties to prior adopters  have greater impact on the adoption of 
board reform (EOS) in family firms than in non-family firms.  
 
Effects of Board Interlocks with Other Family Firms 
Building on social identity theory, Cannella and his colleagues (2015) argue that 
organizations seek outside directors who hold identities with similar organizations. Indeed, 
their study finds that family firms and lone-founder firms seek outside directors from other 
similar firms that have family owners or lone-founder.  Similarly, Lester and Cannella (2006) 
argue that family firms often seek to establish interlocks to other family firms because they 
often share common interests and a common or similar identity. It is theorized that those 
common interests and identity as family firms lead those firms to establish interlock ties to 
other family firms so that family owners can solidify their control (Cannella et al., 2015).    
This tendency of family firms to establish linkages with other family firms has 
important implications on organizational learning. Firms often learn from other similar firms 
(Haunschild, 1993; Kraatz, 1998). As family firms tend to value similar non-economic goals 
due to the common interests and identities (Cannella et al.,2015), outside directors who are 
managers in other family firms are a quite valuable source of relevant information about new 
practices when those managers are already familiar with such practices. Since such directors 
likely understand the common goals and interests that are rather unique among family firms, 
they can provide the information in a way that is helpful to other family firms. Therefore, 
those directors are expected to facilitate the information transfer which likely leads to action.  
Managers and directors who have ties to other family firms also likely help the information 
flow and ultimately the implementation of a new practice. Those managers and directors in 
14 
 
family firms have opportunities to learn how prior adopter firms have implemented a new 
practice. Their board or managerial positions in other family firms with the prior adoption 
experience likely present valuable learning opportunities as those family firms likely care 
about the similar issues and share common or similar non-economic interests. Thus, we 
hypothesize that:     
Hypothesis 3: Board ties to other family firms with prior adoption affect the adoption 
of board reform (EOS) more strongly than those to non-family firms with prior 
adoption.   
 
Family Control and Identity 
While we have predicted that information from other family firms obtained through 
board interlocks leads to the adoption of the board reform, there is likely some variance 
among family firms in terms of the effects of such ties. In this study, we focus on family 
firms’ control and identity and consider their moderating effects.  Specifically, we use family 
ownership and family name in the firm’s name to gorge family firms’ control and identity 
and investigate their effects on the impact of interlock ties to other family firms. Our 
conjecture is that when a family firm has strong equity control, it has greater leeway to tailor 
a new practice to suit the interests of family owners and also it enhances family owners’ 
identity with their firms.  Those owners’ identity can also be enhanced when a firm’s name 
carries the family name (Chang & Shim, 2014). When a family firm has  unique identity, it is 
likely that its members,’  including family owners’ and managers,’ identity as the firm’s 
members rather than a member of “family firm” category becomes more salient than their 
other identities (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994).  When its members strongly identify 
with the firm due to unique family identity, we expect that the firm and its management do 
not necessarily seek information from other family firms simply because the firm belongs to 
the same category as “family firms.”   
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Family ownership control 
 Equity ownership is a key component in retaining family control of a firm. The degree 
of influence over the management and key managerial decisions is often a function of the 
amount of equity ownership that a family holds. When family owners hold a significant 
amount of shares in a firm, they can more easily pursue non-economic goals or seek 
socioemotional wealth using their voting power (Deephouese & Jaskiewicz, 2013; Miller et 
al., 2013).  However, large family ownership may make other investors concerned about 
issues such as the conflict of interests between family owners and other shareholders and 
entrenchment of family managers. Hence, family firms with large family ownership likely 
feel greater pressure to show legitimacy by implementing board reform measures. At the 
same time, however, large family ownership allows the family to have greater leverage to 
seek its non-economic goals without trying to please other shareholders and stakeholders 
(Miller at al., 2013). This suggests that large family ownership provides family firms with 
greater discretion to implement new practices such as board reform and consequently, makes 
the information about how other family firms adopted the board reform less important.  In 
other words, family firms with large family ownership likely have less need to conform to or 
imitate other family firms’ practices.  
Large family ownership also implies that family owners feel a strong sense of 
attachment or belonging to and identity with their firm due to their large financial stake in the 
firm. This suggests that large family ownership enhances the sense of unique family identity 
that is different from other firms.  Hence, those owners may not necessarily perceive other 
family firms as their peers simply because they also have family owners. This suggests that 
the firm’s identity as a member of the family firm category likely becomes less salient for its 
owners and family members as their ownership stake increases. Based on these arguments, 
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information from other family firms through board interlocks is likely less important to such 
firms.  
 On the other hand, families with low ownership would be more concerned about 
retaining the family control when they decide to adopt the board reform. With their limited 
voting power and thus greater sense of insecurity, family members need to carefully design 
the composition of the top management team and board so that they can continue to exert 
influence to pursue their non-economic goals. Further, lower family ownership means the 
presence of other shareholders in the firm, which may somewhat dilute its members’ identity 
with the firm itself and possibly enhances salience of other identities (Dutton et al., 1994), i.e., 
as a member of the family firm category. This gives the family owners incentives to learn 
about how other family firms have implemented the board reform. Hence, board interlocks 
with other family firms with prior experience are likely to be more important for family firms 
with smaller family equity holdings due to their greater insecurity and identity with other 
family firms, which leads to  their incentives to learn from similar firms.          
Hypothesis 4: Family ownership negatively moderators the impact of board ties to 
other family firms with prior adoption on the adoption of the board reform (EOS). 
 
Family name in the firm’s name 
The presence of family legacy is often reflected in strong family values, visions, and 
founding principles in family firms. Chang and Shim (2014) suggest that such legacy is 
particularly strong when firms use the founding family names in the firm names, because the 
founder and other family members strongly identify with the firm that carries the family 
name. Family owners feel a greater responsibility to avoid any decisions that may potentially 
damage the family’s reputation when their companies carry the family name (Deephouse & 
Jaskiewicz, 2013; Dyer & Whetten, 2006) due to the strong identity with the firm. Indeed, the 
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use of the family name in the firm’s name was used as a proxy for family legacy in prior 
studies (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2010; Klasa, 2007).   
While many family firms are under some influence of family legacy, such legacy 
reflected in family values and visions in each firm tends to be unique and is likely different 
among family firms, because they are often built on the founder’s and other family members’ 
own belief, experience, and personality as well as the founding condition (Chan & Shim, 
2014).  For example, several Japanese automotive manufactures take on the founders’ names 
such as Toyota, Honda, and Suzuki, and each firm has its own visions and values.  Also, the 
way the founding family members are involved in the firm differs among these firms. Suzuki 
is characterized by strong managerial control by the Suzuki family, whereas the Honda 
family has no involvement in the management with no significant family ownership position. 
The Toyoda family always has some involvement in the management or on the board, but not 
always as the top executive. Yet, the family legacy is deeply rooted and professional 
executives understand the importance of the presence of the founding family members 
(Kurashina, 2003).  When a family firm has such a strong identity with the founder and 
carries his or her family name in the firm’s name, it is likely that identity as a member of the 
family firm category likely becomes less important or salient for its members. This suggests 
that for such firms, other family firms in general may be simply other information sources 
among others and hence, are not necessarily perceived to have greater relevance. On the other 
hand, family firms without family names in the firms’ name are more likely to identify 
themselves with other family firms as their peers because the unique legacy effect in such 
firms is likely weaker and thus, they tend to see themselves similar to other family firms.  
Hence, they are more willing to learn from other family firms through board interlocks.      
Hypothesis 5: Board ties to other family firms with prior adoption likely have a 
weaker effect in family firms that have family names in their names than family firms 
without family names in the firms’ name on the adoption of the board reform (EOS). 
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METHODS 
Sample and Data 
Our sample includes all non-financial firms listed in the Japanese stock exchanges for 
the period from 1997 to 2002. The total number of firms in our sample is approximately 
3,500.  However, because of new listings, delisting, mergers, and bankruptcy, the number of 
listed firms varies by year. All financial and ownership data were collected from the 
Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) database.  Data on firms’ board structure were gathered 
from the Toyo Keizai database.  
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is the adoption of the Executive Officer 
System (EOS).  We use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i adopt the practice 
in year t, and 0 otherwise.  As we focus on the first adoption of executive officer system (in 
contrast to repeated events), we drop the observation from the sample after the company 
adopted those practices. 
Independent variables.  Our main independent variable is family firm. Family firms 
defined as those with founders or their family members among the ten largest shareholders or 
in top management positions (CEO, President, or Board Chair), consistent with prior works in 
the family business literature with the developed economy and the Japanese context, e.g., 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Mehrotra, Morck, Shim & Wiwattanakantang (2013). We 
used  family ownership which is measured as the ratio of shareholdings by family owners 
who are among a firm’s ten largest shareholders for the control variable when we use family 
firm sub-samples. We chose this measure as only the largest 10 shareholders are disclosed for 
most firms. We constructed family trees for founders and their descendants by consulting the 
following sources: (1) Nihon kaishashi sôran (The Company History in Japan, 1995) that 
provides detailed company history and information including founding year and company 
name change of 3,072 Japanese companies, (2) Zaikai kakeifu daikan (Family Trees of Big 
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Business, 1971) that provides detailed family trees of more than 1,000 Japanese companies, 
and (3) company annual reports and their websites. Our family firms and family ownership 
are measured based on this categorization.2 Other independent variables include the use of 
family name in a focal firm’s name as a proxy for family legacy. The family legacy is a 
dummy variable..  
The number of a focal firm’s board interlocks with prior adoption of the EOS is 
another important variable. In the last, we classify interlocks to prior adopter firms into two 
category,  interlock ties to other family firms and non-family firms. These independent 
variables were lagged by one year (t-1).  
Control variables. We included a number of control variables to account for 
alternative explanations. First, we included Board size and Subsidiary as control variables. 
One of the motivations of EOS is to reduce the board size and thus, we expect that board size 
has a positive relationship with the EOS adoption.  We included the subsidiary dummy to 
control for the effect of the parent company.  We also included two performance measures. 
Specifically, we controlled for a firm’s performance computed as Tobin’s Q and sales growth. 
Firms with a low market-based performance or low growth may be more inclined to adopt the 
EOS due to pressures from investors. In addition, we captured the effect of a firm’s leverage 
on the adoption of the EOS. We also controlled for CEO age because it can affect a CEO’s 
propensity to implement new practices. We predict that older CEOs are less likely to adopt 
the EOS.  
We also included control variables for different types of ownership. Foreign 
ownership is one of the variables that may influence the legitimacy of board reform. This 
variable is measured as the ratio of shareholdings by foreign investors who are among a 
                                                          
2 The Center for Economic Institutions at the Hitotsubashi University developed its ownership (covering 1950–
1983) and board (covering 1962–1988) databases for all Japanese listed companies available to researchers. 
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firm’s ten largest shareholders. Bank ownership is also included because of the significant 
influence large banks have over managerial decisions in the Japanese context. This variable is 
calculated as the ratio of bank ownership among a firm’s ten largest shareholders. In the last, 
we control for  industry diffusion. To capture this influence we computed the ratio of 
adopting firms in the same industry as the focal firm for each year. The industry classification 
is based on the 2 digit industry classification code.  The effects of all control variables have 
been ascertained by prior literature and were lagged by one year (t-1).  
Analysis 
             As our dependent variables are dummy variables which indicate the  board reform 
(EOS), we employed a logit regression to analyze the data.  In line with prior literature, we 
used a discrete-time logit specification of event history with each spell corresponding to a 
year (Gimeno et al., 2005; Tuschke et al., 2014). This model is especially suited to account 
for right-censoring that accrues for firms that do not adopt the EOS throughout the 
observation period. 
Our sample spans the time period from 1997 to 2002.  Consequently we have six 
spells that were updated annually to accommodate time-varying covariates. Once a firm 
adopted EOS, the next year’s risk set was diminished by that firm.  As stated, we drop the 
observation from the sample after the company adopted the EOS. 
The fact that limited dependent variable models (in our case is Logit) are intrinsically 
nonlinear, it complicates interpretation of findings.  A unit change in an explanatory variable 
on the dependent variable (marginal effect) does not equal the variable’s model coefficient. In 
addition, the value of this marginal effect varies with the value of all model variables. These 
facts imply that, in an LDV model, an explanatory variable’s estimated coefficient can rarely 
be used to infer the true nature of the relationship between the explanatory variable and the 
dependent variable (Hoetker, 2007; Wiersema and Bowen, 2009). There are two common 
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solutions for this. The first is to compute the value of the marginal effect using the sample 
mean of all variables and assesses its significance. The second method computes the average 
of the individual marginal effect values at each observation and assesses its significance. In 
this paper, we followed the first method and compute the marginal effects of explanatory 
variables with the Stata command mfx. We used the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of 
variance for the robust standard errors. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the correlation matrix. The correlations in this table indicate there is no 
multicollinearity problem. Table 2 shows the results for our hypotheses 1 and 2.  Column 1 is 
the baseline model and only control variables are included. Column 2 is the effect of board 
interlocks to prior adopter firms.  This effect shows the positive impact on the EOS adoption 
after controlling for alternative explanation.  Column 3 is the effect of family firm and the 
interaction between family firm and board interlocks to prior adopter firms. Family firm 
shows a negative sign and statistically significant.  This suggests that family firms are not 
likely to adopt the EOS supporting Hypothesis 1.  The interaction term has a positive sign 
and statistically significant.  This means that the effect of board interlocks to prior adopter 
firms on the EOS adoption is stronger in family firm than in non-family firms. Thus, the 
Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Tables 3 show the results for our hypothesis 3. The Model 1 in Table 3 shows that the 
effects of board interlocks to prior adopter firms among family firms are positive and 
significant. The Models 2,3 and 4 in Table 3 show the impact of board ties to other family 
firms or non-family firms on the adoption of the EOS.  It is clear from this table that only 
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board interlocks with other family firms with prior adoption have a significant impact on the 
adoption decision and the result for ties with non-family firms show no significance. These 
results provide strong support for Hypothesis 3. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 4 -1 presents the results for Hypothesis 4.  The table compares the results for 
firms with family ownership below median and those above median by splitting the sample.  
These results show that while board interlocks with other family firms with prior adoption 
have a significant impact in firms in both groups, the effect is more significant in firms with 
family ownership below median than above median.  Hence, the results are largely consistent 
with Hypothesis 4. Table 4-2 shows the interaction effect of family ownership and interlock 
ties on the EOS adoption.  We found no significant interaction effect of family ownership and 
board ties to prior family firm adopters, suggesting family firms with large family ownership 
do not learn from other family firms when they implement the EOS.  
Finally, we present the results for Hypothesis 5 in Tables 5-1 and 5-2.  These tables 
compare the results for firms without family legacy and those with family legacy by splitting 
the sample. The results indicate that while board ties to other family firms with prior adoption 
have a positive and significant impact on the adoption in family firms without family legacy, 
they have no impact in firms with family legacy.  Ties with family firms with prior adoption 
are important only for family firms without family legacy or with no family name in firms’ 
name.  These results are consistent with Hypothesis 5.  The interaction effect analysis shown 
in Table 5-2 also marginally supports Hypothesis 5. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 4-1, 4-2, 5-1 and 5-2  
------------------------------------------- 
Additional test 
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 To investigate the difference between family firms and non-family firms further, we 
have examined the effects of board interlocks to prior adopters with a sub-sample of non-
family firms as shown in the Table in the appendix.  This table shows that interlock ties to 
prior adopter firms, both to non-family and family firms, have no significant impact on the 
adoption of the EOS in non-family firms.  However, the results show that board size as well 
as foreign ownership and bank ownership are significantly related to the EOS adoption.  
While board size is also significant for the family firm sub-sample, foreign ownership and 
bank ownership are significant only for the non-family firm sub-sample. Further, the industry 
diffusion is weakly significant for the non-family sub-sample, while it is not significant for 
the family firm sub-sample. These results suggest that pressure from those owners and 
industry-level diffusion rather than information gained through board ties to prior adopters 
tends to drive the adoption decision in non-family firms.  They present further evidence that 
family firms are different from non-family firms. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study has examined the effects of family control and director interlocks on the 
adoption of board reform measure or the EOS among family firms in Japan. The results on 
the adoption of the EOS reveal interesting behavior of family firms.  Our findings show that 
family firms are more likely to oppose the adoption of the EOS, because the family owners 
do not prefer a board reform that constrains their board power and discretion and also may 
limit career opportunities for employees of the firm they own.  This finding is consistent with 
our argument that as family firms pursue non-economic goals and the board reform may 
potentially pose a threat to such goals, family firms generally tend not to implement such 
practice.    
Our results have also shown that family firms that have board ties with prior adopters 
are more likely to adopt the EOS.  This suggests that even though family firms generally do 
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not prefer to implement the board reform practice that may constrain their discretion and 
power, they are more likely to implement it when the board has ties with prior adopters.  This 
supports our argument that information about the EOS transferred through such ties could 
mitigate family owners’ anxiety over the loss of managerial control and thus, board ties to 
prior adopter firms lead to the adoption decision.  Hence, we can argue that organizational 
learning through board interlocks encourage family owners to seek greater legitimacy 
through board reform that external investors generally support.     
This study also found that board ties to other family firms with prior adoption 
facilitate the adoption of the EOS.  This is consistent with the view that a firm learns from 
other similar firms (Kraatz, 1998).  However, the impact of such ties disappears or at least 
weakens when family firms have large family ownership or strong family legacy (family 
name in the firm’s name in this study). These findings suggest that family firms are quite 
heterogeneous as recent research suggests (Wright et al., 2014) and hence, their propensity to 
learn from other family firms varies significantly. In this study, we have focused on family 
firms’ unique identity and ownership stake and shown that these factors negatively affect 
family firms’ learning from other family firms.        
This study makes several important contributions. First, it contributes to the family 
business research by showing that family firms vary in their likelihood to adopt new practices 
depending upon how each practice impacts their non-economic goals or socioemotional 
wealth.  Our results suggest that family firms rather not adopt the EOS as such a board reform 
measure may have a negative impact on family control and discretion. Further, a reduction of 
board size that comes with the EOS may limit non-family managers’ opportunities to be 
“promoted” to board or senior management positions. Hence, the EOS is not consistent with 
one aspect of family owners’ non-economic objectives. This implies that, other things being 
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equal, family owners prioritize their greater control and discretion over external legitimacy 
when it comes to changes in the board or top management structure.    
Second, this study integrates the board interlock research and the family business 
research, especially by taking family owners’ unique non-economic interests into 
consideration when family firms adopt new practices. We have shown how information 
transferred by board interlocks is acted on in family firms.  Since family owners usually have 
a broad set of interests, such as financial gain, managerial and board control, preservation of 
employee loyalty, and enhancement of external legitimacy, how family firms decide to adopt 
a new practice may be quite different from non-family firms. We have investigated this issue 
by focusing on a contentious governance practice that started to spread in the late 1990s in 
Japan. Our empirical analyses show that family firms and non-family firms are indeed 
different in terms of the effects of board interlocks on the adoption decision.    
Further, we have extended prior research on the transfer of new practices or 
organizational learning by showing that a similar logic is applicable to the adoption of 
corporate governance reform. Specifically, this study has built on prior research which 
suggests that firms learn from similar other firms (Haunschild, 1993; Kraatz, 1998). While a 
recent study by Cannella et al. (2015) shows that family firms (or lone founder firms) tend to 
appoint directors from other family firms (or other lone founder firms) because those 
directors likely share identities with similar firms, our study went one step further and 
examined whether family firms learn a new practice through directors linked to other similar 
firms. Other things being equal, we show that they do as consistent with prior research.  
However, we have also shown that the impact of such ties disappears or weakens under 
certain conditions; high family ownership and the presence of strong family legacy in this 
study.  This suggests that as ownership stake or legacy increases or strengthens, the 
likelihood of organizational learning through board ties with other family firms decreases. 
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These results indicate that family firms do not always learn from other family firms through 
board ties simply because they belong to the category. Hence, we present more nuanced 
relationships among family firms in terms of their organizational learning behavior.    
Our study has some limitations that provide future research opportunities. First, as we 
have only examined the relatively early stage of diffusion process, we may find different 
patterns of adoption decisions when these practices are much widely diffused in later stages 
(Haunschild & Beckman, 1998).  As a wider diffusion allows for more sources of information 
about specific practices, the impact of board ties may possibly be reduced over time. Looking 
at the phenomenon over a longer period of time will allow us to investigate the changing 
influences of board ties on the adoption decisions.    
Secondly, this study has focused on a firm’s decision to adopt the EOS without 
considering how the practice was actually implemented. It is possible that there are 
differences between family firms and non-family firms in terms of how the board reform was 
implemented.  For example, as family firms are generally not very keen on board reform 
measures that constrain family owners’ control and discretion, they may implement the EOS 
in a more symbolic way rather than substantively.  Future research can further examine the 
actual implementation and investigate how family owners’ objective to preserve 
socioemotional wealth may affect it.   
Lastly, as this study uses the Japanese data, we need to be cautious about generalizing 
our results to family firms in other contexts. Compared to listed family firms in other 
institutional contexts especially emerging markets, family ownership stakes in listed Japanese 
firms tend to be lower.  Therefore, family owners in listed Japanese firms may be more 
sensitive about losing their control and discretion.  More studies on the effects of board 
interlocks on organizational learning of contentious or sensitive managerial practices in 
family firms are thus needed.   
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Family firms are often driven by their own unique objectives and hence, they tend to 
behave differently from non-family firms. Multiple aspects of those objectives are, however, 
not always compatible; pursuing one aspect of those objectives may jeopardize other aspects.  
For example, family owners may sometimes find retaining control and gaining external 
legitimacy are in conflict (Vardaman & Gondo, 2014).  Managers of family firms thus have 
to manage and balance those differences by weighing the costs and benefits of their decisions. 
This study has shown that the adoption decision of new practices by family firms is 
influenced not only by the unique objectives of those firms but also by the sources of 
information about the practices, as each source brings different benefits (and possibly costs) 
to family owners. This suggests that we have to look at the relationship between family 
owners’ incentives and the roles of different actors who provide information to understand 
how family firms make adoption decisions. Lastly, family firms are quite heterogeneous and 
we need to look into this heterogeneity into consideration when we examine their behavior.  
This study focuses on the scope of family involvement, ownership stake, and family legacy 
and the effects of such factors on the use of board ties to other family firms when family 
firms implement a contentious practice. Future research can look at other dimensions to 
uncover heterogeneity among family firms.         
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix 
 
N=12,687;  
* Correlation coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Mean S.D. ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 10 ) ( 11 ) ( 12 ) ( 13 )
( 1 ) Initial adoption of EOS 0.043 0.204 1
( 2 ) Family firms (t-1) 0.506 0.500 -0.0343* 1
( 3 ) Family ownership (t-1) 10.765 16.684 -0.0515* 0.6376* 1
( 4 ) Interlocks to prior adopter firms (t-1) 0.165 0.518 0.0344* -0.1960* -0.1324* 1
( 5 ) Board size (t-1) 12.655 6.496 0.1091* -0.2054* -0.2683* 0.0465* 1
( 6 ) Subsidiary (t-1) 0.201 0.401 -0.0171 -0.2714* -0.0383* 0.1942* -0.0779* 1
( 7 ) Tobin's Q (t-1) 1.388 0.582 0.0242* 0.1253* 0.1632* -0.0052 0.0189 -0.0194 1
( 8 ) Sales growth (t-1) 0.003 0.151 -0.0112 0.0713* 0.1047* -0.0099 -0.0153 0.0042 0.2702* 1
( 9 ) Leverage (t-1) 0.189 0.155 -0.0016 -0.0475* -0.0553* -0.0268* 0.0464* -0.0406* -0.2793* -0.0820* 1
( 10 ) CEO age (t-1) 60.636 7.410 0.0075 -0.2994* -0.2765* 0.0446* 0.1943* 0.0503* -0.1227* -0.0918* 0.0212 1
( 11 ) Foreign ownership (t-1) 1.650 5.853 0.0319* -0.0278* -0.0432* 0.0187 0.0211 -0.0461* 0.1668* 0.0755* -0.1149* -0.0734* 1
( 12 ) Bank ownership (t-1) 11.123 7.042 0.0541* -0.0625* -0.2781* -0.1187* 0.3181* -0.2777* 0.1002* -0.0063 -0.0318* 0.1196* -0.0935* 1
( 13 ) Industry diffusion (t-1) 0.068 0.060 0.0566* 0.0527* 0.1021* 0.0480* -0.1771* 0.0192 -0.0085 -0.0919* -0.0558* -0.0478* 0.0410* -0.1115* 1
Variables
32 
 
Table 2: Results on EOS Adoption – Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
T values appear in parentheses.     
 +, *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively. 
The value of the coefficient is the marginal effects using the sample mean of all variables. 
 
Column ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
Classification of family control Base model Effect of ties Family firms
Interlocks to prior adopter firms (t-1) 0.0047** 0.0009
(2.62) (0.40)
Family firms (t-1) -0.0083**
(3.05)
Interlocks to prior adopter firms (t-1)*Family firms (t-1) 0.0150***
(3.30)
Board size (t-1) 0.0019*** 0.0018*** 0.0018***
(10.54) (10.38) (10.27)
Subsidiary (t-1) 0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0017
(0.35) (0.07) (0.52)
Tobin's Q (t-1) 0.0042* 0.0040* 0.0045*
(2.18) (2.05) (2.37)
Sales growth (t-1) -0.0161+ -0.0163+ -0.0153+
(1.91) (1.94) (1.86)
Leverage (t-1) 0.0090 0.0092 0.0080
(1.17) (1.20) (1.05)
CEO age (t-1) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.92) (1.00) (1.47)
Foreign ownership (t-1) 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004**
(3.09) (3.03) (2.77)
Bank ownership (t-1) 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0006***
(3.78) (4.06) (3.57)
Industry diffusion (t-1) 0.0732* 0.0733* 0.0706*
(2.55) (2.56) (2.55)
Number of observation 12687 12687 12687
Pseudo R2 0.0956 0.0956 0.1051
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Logit regression (Marginal effect)
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Table 3: Results on EOS Adoption -- Hypothesis 3 (Family Firm Subsample) 
 
T values appear in parentheses.     
 +, *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.  
The value of the coefficient is the marginal effects using the sample mean of all variables.   
Column ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
Classification of board interlocks All ties
Ties to other non-
family firm
Ties to other family
firm
Both effect
Interlocks to prior adopter firms (t-1) 0.0135***                
(3.54)                
Interlock ties to other non-family firms (t-1) 0.0056 0.0056   
(0.98) (1.01)   
Interlock ties to other family firms (t-1) 0.0179*** 0.0179***
(3.31) (3.32)   
Family ownership (t-1) -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005***
(4.04) (4.11) (4.46) (4.34)   
Board size (t-1) 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013***
(5.92) (5.92) (5.80) (5.83)   
Subsidiary (t-1) -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008   
(0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)   
Tobin's Q (t-1) 0.0055* 0.0057* 0.0054* 0.0054*  
(2.42) (2.45) (2.38) (2.38)   
Sales growth (t-1) -0.0229* -0.0232* -0.0212+ -0.0217+  
(2.03) (2.04) (1.88) (1.92)   
Leverage (t-1) 0.0037 0.0026 0.0032 0.0035   
(0.36) (0.24) (0.31) (0.34)   
CEO age (t-1) -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004*  
(2.24) (2.38) (2.25) (2.23)   
Foreign ownership (t-1) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002   
(0.57) (0.44) (0.54) (0.57)   
Bank ownership (t-1) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001   
(0.45) (0.26) (0.37) (0.42)   
Industry diffusion (t-1) 0.0568 0.0569 0.0587 0.0582   
(1.27) (1.25) (1.31) (1.30)   
Number of observation 6419 6419 6419 6419
Pseudo R2 0.0905 0.0840 0.0916 0.0920
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Logit regression (Marginal effect)
Family Sub-sample
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Table 4-1: Results on EOS Adoption – Family Ownership Effect (H4) (Family Firm Subsample) 
 
 
T values appear in parentheses.     
 +, *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively. 
The value of the coefficient is the marginal effects using the sample mean of all variables. 
 
 
Column ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
Classification of interlocking directors All ties
Ties to
other non-
family firm
Ties to
other family
firm
Both effect All ties
Ties to
other non-
family firm
Ties to
other family
firm
Both effect
Interlocks to prior adopter firms (t-1) 0.0172** 0.0074+
(3.17) (1.69)
Interlock ties to other non-family firms (t-1) 0.0107 0.0108 . .
(1.60) (1.63) . .
Interlock ties to other family firms (t-1) 0.0268*** 0.0268*** 0.0098+ 0.0097+
(3.43) (3.45) (1.92) (1.88)
Family ownership (t-1) -0.0009+ -0.0010* -0.0010* -0.0009+ -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005**
(1.88) (2.05) (2.04) (1.92) (2.63) (2.83) (2.74) (2.87)
Board size (t-1) 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0016*** 0.0015*** 0.0015***
(4.53) (4.45) (4.45) (4.50) (4.43) (4.53) (4.34) (4.32)
Subsidiary (t-1) -0.0166* -0.0172* -0.0173* -0.0168* 0.0063 0.0089 0.0063 0.0073
(2.11) (2.20) (2.27) (2.16) (0.77) (1.00) (0.77) (0.85)
Tobin's Q (t-1) 0.0067+ 0.0068+ 0.0064+ 0.0065+ 0.0049+ 0.0054* 0.0050+ 0.0052+
(1.80) (1.81) (1.74) (1.76) (1.84) (2.00) (1.87) (1.95)
Sales growth (t-1) -0.0230 -0.0221 -0.0196 -0.0213 -0.0217 -0.0220 -0.0211 -0.0208
(1.39) (1.34) (1.17) (1.29) (1.48) (1.47) (1.43) (1.39)
Leverage (t-1) 0.0214 0.0210 0.0190 0.0202 -0.0133 -0.0134 -0.0124 -0.0117
(1.52) (1.47) (1.35) (1.43) (0.88) (0.88) (0.83) (0.79)
CEO age (t-1) -0.0004+ -0.0005+ -0.0004+ -0.0004 -0.0004+ -0.0005+ -0.0004+ -0.0004+
(1.67) (1.74) (1.68) (1.64) (1.70) (1.87) (1.68) (1.73)
Foreign ownership (t-1) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
(0.41) (0.32) (0.39) (0.43) (0.42) (0.26) (0.41) (0.35)
Bank ownership (t-1) -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.09) (0.27) (0.17) (0.08) (0.30) (0.14) (0.30) (0.24)
Industry diffusion (t-1) 0.0768 0.0753 0.0811 0.0799 0.0310 0.0283 0.0316 0.0308
(1.12) (1.08) (1.16) (1.15) (0.53) (0.48) (0.54) (0.53)
Number of observation 3209 3209 3209 3209 3210 3210 3210 3210
Pseudo R2 0.1003 0.0947 0.1005 0.1022 0.0800 0.0777 0.0828 0.0841
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Low family ownership group (Below Median) High family ownership group (above Median)
35 
 
Table 4-2: Results on EOS Adoption – Family Ownership Effect (H4) (Family Firm Subsample) 
 
T values appear in parentheses.     
 +, *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively. 
The value of the coefficient is the marginal effects using the sample mean of all variables. 
Column ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
Classification of interlocking directors All ties
Ties to other non-
family firm
Ties to other
family firm
Both effect
Interlocks to prior adopter firms (t-1) 0.0135***
(3.54)
Interlock ties to other non-family firms (t-1) 0.0169* 0.0167*
(2.45) (2.46)
Interlock ties to other non-family firms (t-1)*Family ownership (t-1) -0.0019* -0.0018*
(2.43) (2.36)
Interlock ties to other family firms (t-1) 0.0218** 0.0219**
(3.13) (3.17)
Interlock ties to other family firms (t-1)*Family ownership (t-1) -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.84) (0.91)
Family ownership (t-1) -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0004***
(4.04) (3.98) (4.18) (3.92)
Board size (t-1) 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013***
(5.92) (5.97) (5.84) (5.92)
Subsidiary (t-1) -0.0004 0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0001
(0.07) (0.14) (0.05) (0.02)
Tobin's Q (t-1) 0.0055* 0.0058* 0.0055* 0.0056*
(2.42) (2.51) (2.43) (2.48)
Sales growth (t-1) -0.0229* -0.0227* -0.0216+ -0.0216+
(2.03) (2.00) (1.91) (1.91)
Leverage (t-1) 0.0037 0.0030 0.0032 0.0039
(0.36) (0.28) (0.31) (0.38)
CEO age (t-1) -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004*
(2.24) (2.42) (2.25) (2.26)
Foreign ownership (t-1) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.57) (0.43) (0.56) (0.57)
Bank ownership (t-1) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.45) (0.20) (0.41) (0.39)
Industry diffusion (t-1) 0.0568 0.0571 0.0586 0.0582
(1.27) (1.26) (1.31) (1.30)
Number of observation 6419 6419 6419 6419
Pseudo R2 0.0905 0.0859 0.0919 0.0941
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Logit regression (Marginal effect)
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Table 5-1:  Results on EOS Adoption – Family Legacy (H5) (Family Firm Subsample) 
 
T values appear in parentheses.     
 +, *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively. 
The value of the coefficient is the marginal effects using the sample mean of all variables. 
 
 
Column ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
Classification of interlocking directors All ties
Ties to
other non-
family firm
Ties to
other family
firm
Both effect All ties
Ties to
other non-
family firm
Ties to
other family
firm
Both effect
Interlocks to prior adopter firms (t-1) 0.0158*** 0.0014
(3.59) (1.03)
Interlock ties to other non-family firms (t-1) 0.0016 0.0011 0.0017 0.0018
(0.22) (0.16) (1.22) (1.24)
Interlock ties to other family firms (t-1) 0.0258*** 0.0257*** 0.0014 0.0015
(5.20) (5.20) (1.39) (1.29)
Family ownership (t-1) -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(3.40) (3.58) (3.94) (3.91) (0.91) (1.22) (1.52) (1.20)
Board size (t-1) 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0002 0.0002*** 0.0002 0.0002***
(5.29) (5.26) (5.31) (5.31) (1.26) (4.39) . (3.73)
Subsidiary (t-1) 0.0003 0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006
(0.04) (0.21) (0.08) (0.08) (0.32) (0.37) (0.34) (0.33)
Tobin's Q (t-1) 0.0041 0.0041 0.0035 0.0035 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011+ 0.0011
(1.49) (1.45) (1.28) (1.29) (1.01) (1.55) (1.94) (1.52)
Sales growth (t-1) -0.0154 -0.0153 -0.0136 -0.0137 -0.0062 -0.0069+ -0.0061* -0.0070+
(1.09) (1.08) (0.95) (0.96) (1.09) (1.94) (2.09) (1.87)
Leverage (t-1) 0.0023 0.0004 0.0018 0.0019 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
(0.18) (0.03) (0.14) (0.15) (0.24) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24)
CEO age (t-1) -0.0004+ -0.0004+ -0.0004+ -0.0004+ -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001+ -0.0001+
(1.75) (1.81) (1.89) (1.88) (1.05) (1.97) (1.96) (1.72)
Foreign ownership (t-1) -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001+ 0.0001
(0.22) (0.38) (0.28) (0.27) (1.01) (1.55) (1.82) (1.56)
Bank ownership (t-1) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.41) (0.23) (0.35) (0.35) (0.30) (0.21) (0.23) (0.31)
Industry diffusion (t-1) 0.0699 0.0709 0.0761 0.0759 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0018
(1.26) (1.25) (1.38) (1.38) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Number of observation 4428 4428 4428 4428 1842 1842 1842 1842
Pseudo R2 0.0928 0.0848 0.0985 0.0985 0.1095 0.1061 0.1076 0.1096
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No family legacy (firm name is not family name) Family legacy (family name is included in firm name)
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Table 5-2:  Results on EOS Adoption – Family Legacy (H5) (Family Firm Subsample) 
 
T values appear in parentheses.     
 +, *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively. 
The value of the coefficient is the marginal effects using the sample mean of all variables. 
 
 
Column ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
Classification of interlocking directors All ties
Ties to other non-
family firm
Ties to other
family firm
Both effect
Interlocks to prior adopter firms (t-1) 0.0139***
(3.51)
Interlock ties to other non-family firms (t-1) 0.0029 0.0025
(0.41) (0.36)
Interlock ties to other non-family firms (t-1)*Family legacy (t-1) 0.0085 0.0091
(0.73) (0.82)
Interlock ties to other family firms (t-1) 0.0252*** 0.0252***
(5.12) (5.13)
Interlock ties to other family firms (t-1)*Family legacy (t-1) -0.0150+ -0.0150+
(1.77) (1.76)
Family ownership (t-1) -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0005***
(3.70) (3.83) (4.20) (4.07)
Board size (t-1) 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0013***
(5.93) (5.94) (5.89) (5.93)
Subsidiary (t-1) 0.0008 0.0019 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.13) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00)
Tobin's Q (t-1) 0.0047* 0.0048* 0.0043+ 0.0042+
(1.99) (2.00) (1.84) (1.80)
Sales growth (t-1) -0.0229+ -0.0230+ -0.0211+ -0.0217+
(1.91) (1.91) (1.74) (1.79)
Leverage (t-1) 0.0035 0.0019 0.0031 0.0033
(0.33) (0.18) (0.29) (0.32)
CEO age (t-1) -0.0004* -0.0005* -0.0005* -0.0004*
(2.30) (2.47) (2.42) (2.42)
Foreign ownership (t-1) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.72) (0.56) (0.72) (0.70)
Bank ownership (t-1) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.61) (0.40) (0.51) (0.56)
Industry diffusion (t-1) 0.0447 0.0445 0.0494 0.0489
(0.99) (0.97) (1.10) (1.09)
Number of observation 6270 6270 6270 6270
Pseudo R2 0.0905 0.0840 0.0936 0.0942
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Logit regression (Marginal effect)
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Appendix  
Table: Results on EOS Adoption -- Hypothesis 3 (Non-family firm subsample) 
 
T values appear in parentheses.     
 +, *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.  
The value of the coefficient is the marginal effects using the sample mean of all variables.   
 
Column ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
Classification of board interlocks All ties
Ties to other non-
family firm
Ties to other family
firm
Both effect
Interlocks to prior adopter firms (t-1) 0.0004                
(0.17)                
Interlock ties to other non-family firms (t-1) -0.0009 -0.0009   
(0.34) (0.35)   
Interlock ties to other family firms (t-1) 0.0039 0.0040   
(0.94) (0.95)   
Family ownership (t-1) . . . .
. . . .
Board size (t-1) 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0021***
(7.77) (7.79) (7.78) (7.77)   
Subsidiary (t-1) 0.0014 0.0017 0.0016 0.0018   
(0.31) (0.38) (0.37) (0.42)   
Tobin's Q (t-1) 0.0056+ 0.0056+ 0.0052+ 0.0053+  
(1.81) (1.84) (1.69) (1.70)   
Sales growth (t-1) -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0058 -0.0058   
(0.46) (0.45) (0.50) (0.50)   
Leverage (t-1) 0.0101 0.0098 0.0095 0.0092   
(0.89) (0.86) (0.84) (0.82)   
CEO age (t-1) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002   
(0.67) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67)   
Foreign ownership (t-1) 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 
(2.60) (2.60) (2.63) (2.63)   
Bank ownership (t-1) 0.0007** 0.0006** 0.0007** 0.0007** 
(2.76) (2.68) (2.81) (2.76)   
Industry diffusion (t-1) 0.0678+ 0.0678+ 0.0686+ 0.0687+  
(1.88) (1.88) (1.91) (1.91)   
Number of observation 6268 6268 6268 6268
Pseudo R2 0.1151 0.1151 0.1154 0.1154
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Logit regression (Marginal effect)
Non-family Sub-sample
